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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society sued several 
managed health care organizations on behalf of its member 
psychiatrists and their patients. The gravamen of its 
complaint was that the managed health care organizations 
impaired the quality of health care provided by 
psychiatrists to their patients by refusing to authorize 
necessary psychiatric treatment, excessively burdening the 
reimbursement process and impeding other vital care. 
 
The principal issue on appeal is whether the 
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society has properly pleaded 
associational and third-party standing. Finding the Society 
would require significant individual participation to 
establish its member psychiatrists' claims, the District 
Court dismissed its complaint for lack of associational 
standing.1 The District Court also found the Society's 
member psychiatrists lacked third-party standing to pursue 
their patients' claims. As an alternative ground for 
dismissal, the District Court held the mandatory arbitration 
provision in the psychiatrists' contracts barred the Society 
from advancing their members' claims in court. 
 
We believe the District Court's dismissal under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) was premature. For this reason, we will 
vacate and remand for further proceedings. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and 
Recommendation in full. 
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I. 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1331 because certain claims asserted by the 
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society arose under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 
U.S.C. SS 1001-1461.2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The case was removed from state court under ERISA's civil 
enforcement provision, S 502(a)(1)(b), which preempts state court 
jurisdiction for claims by a plan participant "to recover benefits due to 
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms 
of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms 
of 
the plan." 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. 
Taylor, 
481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 
(1987). 
 
To discern which claims are preempted, "we embraced a distinction 
between claims pertaining to the quality of the medical benefits provided 
to a plan participant [that is, not preempted] and claims that the plan 
participant was entitled to, but did not receive, a certain quantum of 
benefits under his or her plan [that is, preempted]." In re U.S. 
Healthcare, 
Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing  Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1995)), cert. denied sub nom., U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc. v. Bauman, 530 U.S. 1242 (2000). Explaining this 
distinction in the Supreme Court's lexicon, we recently restated our 
position that "challenges [to] the administration of or eligibility for 
benefits [i.e., quantity] . . . fall[ ] within the scope of S 502(a) and 
[are] 
completely preempted . . . ." Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 
F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2001). To this end, claims against HMO policies 
that purportedly delay care "fall within the realm of the administration 
of benefits." Id. 
 
On behalf of its members' patients, the Pennsylvania Psychiatric 
Society alleges the MCOs implemented policies to discourage or prevent 
subscribers from using mental health services. UnderS 502(a), "[r]elief 
may take the form of accrued benefits due, a declaratory judgment on 
entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against a plan administrator's 
improper refusal to pay benefits." Dedeaux , 481 U.S. at 53. In this case, 
the relief sought involves the administration of benefits, because it 
would 
change the quantum of mental health services provided. These 
allegations fall within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provision, 
and, therefore, removal was proper as ERISA completely preempts at 
least some of the claims alleged by the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society 
on behalf of its members' patients. 
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II. 
 
The Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society, a nonprofit 
corporation representing licensed psychiatrists in 
Pennsylvania, filed suit on behalf of its member 
psychiatrists and their patients who subscribe to managed 
health care plans administered by Green Spring Health 
Services. 
 
There are several defendants. Green Spring Health 
Services, Inc. provides a network of psychiatrists as well as 
administrative services for managed health care plans; 
Magellan Health Services, Inc. is its corporate parent. 
Keystone Health Plan West, Inc., Keystone Health Plan 
Central, Inc., and Keystone Health Plan East, Inc. are 
health maintenance organizations that contract with Green 
Spring Health Services to provide mental health and 
substance abuse services to their subscribers. Highmark, 
Inc. is the parent company of Keystone Health Plan West 
(these managed care organizations collectively are referred 
to as "the MCOs"). Green Spring Health Services, Magellan 
Health Services and Highmark choose which psychiatrists 
to credential to provide these services. 
 
Green Spring Health Services administers the psychiatric 
and substance abuse services for the employee benefit 
plans provided by the health management organizations. 
For this purpose, it enters into contracts with psychiatrists 
(the "Provider Agreement") to form a provider network to 
service the plans. In particular, the Provider Agreement 
assures that Green Spring Health Services will not 
undermine the psychiatrists' responsibility to provide 
patients with the mental health services they require. For 
most disputes arising between credentialed psychiatrists 
and Green Spring Health Services, the Provider Agreement 
also contains a mandatory arbitration clause that requires 
exhaustion of internal review procedures before seeking 
binding arbitration. 
 
Alleging the MCOs unfairly profit at the expense of the 
psychiatrists and their patients, the Pennsylvania 
Psychiatric Society asserts several tort and breach of 
contract claims for impeding necessary psychiatric 
treatment. The Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society contends 
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the MCOs refused to authorize and provide reimbursement 
for medically necessary mental health treatment; interfered 
with patients' care by permitting non-psychiatrists to make 
psychiatric treatment decisions; violated Provider 
Agreements by improperly terminating relationships with 
certain psychiatrists; and breached the contractual duties 
of good faith and fair dealing by failing to timely pay 
psychiatrists and by referring patients to inconvenient 
treatment locations, thereby depriving some patients access 
to treatment. 
 
On the basis of these allegations, the Pennsylvania 
Psychiatric Society claims the MCOs tortiously interfered 
with the psychiatrists' livelihood as well as the psychiatrist- 
patient relationship. In addition, the Society asserts the 
MCOs fraudulently misrepresented the quality of care their 
plans would provide to subscribers and the benefits 
psychiatrists would receive for providing their services. 
Finally, on behalf of its members' patients, the Society 
alleges the MCOs made false representations to their 
subscribers in violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Const. Stat. 
Ann. S 201-1 et seq. (West 2001). 
 
The complaint sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, 
and damages. The Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society does 
not appeal the dismissal of its damages claims. 
 
The suit commenced in state court but was removed to 
federal court on grounds that ERISA preempted all or, at 
least, some of the Society's claims. Recommending 
dismissal, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and 
Recommendation finding the Society lacked standing to 
assert the claims of its members and their patients. As an 
alternative ground for dismissal, the Magistrate Judge 
found the mandatory arbitration clause in the psychiatrists' 
contracts foreclosed advancing the claims in court. The 
District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report. The 
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society timely appealed. 
 
III. 
 
The Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society's ability to press the 
claims of its members and their patients initially hinges on 
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whether it meets the constitutional requirements for 
associational standing. For its part, the Society seeks only 
to pursue claims on behalf of its members and their 
patients; it does not allege direct injury to itself. 
 
Our review of a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
for lack of standing is plenary. ACLU-NJ v. Township of 
Wall, 246 F.3d 258, 261 (3d Cir. 2001); Gen. Instrument 
Corp. v. Nu-Tek Elecs. & Mfg., Inc., 197 F.3d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 
1999). On appeal, we must accept as true all material 
allegations of the complaint and draw all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to plaintiff. Maio v. 
Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000). " `The 
issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but 
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support 
the claims.' " In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). Therefore, we may affirm the 
district court only if we believe that the association would 
be entitled to no relief under any set of facts consistent 
with its allegations. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 434-35 (3d Cir. 2000); City of Pittsburgh 
v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 262 n.12 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
 
A. 
 
To satisfy the "case or controversy" standing requirement 
under Article III, S 2 of the United States Constitution, a 
plaintiff must establish that it has suffered a cognizable 
injury that is causally related to the alleged conduct of the 
defendant and is redressable by judicial action. Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 
167, 180-81 (2000) (discussing Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); The Pitt News v. 
Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2000). Associations may 
satisfy these elements by asserting claims that arise from 
injuries they directly sustain. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United 
Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 299 n.11 (1979). 
Absent injury to itself, an association may pursue claims 
solely as a representative of its members. See, e.g., New 
York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 
(1988); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. 
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Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997). By 
permitting associational standing, we "recognize[ ] that the 
primary reason people join an organization is often to 
create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they 
share with others." Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & 
Agric. Implement Workers v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 
(1986); see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (noting purpose of joining an association "often 
is to permit the association . . . to vindicate the interests of 
all"). 
 
The Supreme Court has enunciated a three-prong test for 
associational standing. An association must demonstrate 
that "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue 
in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are 
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the 
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt v. 
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 
(1977) (permitting state agency that represented apple 
industry to challenge North Carolina statute); see also 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. at 181; Hosp. Council v. City 
of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1991). The need for 
some individual participation, however, does not necessarily 
bar associational standing under this third criterion. 
Hospital Council, 949 F.2d at 89-90. 
 
In this case, the MCOs concede the Pennsylvania 
Psychiatric Society satisfies Hunt's first and second prongs. 
But echoing defendants' objections, the District Court 
found the psychiatrists' claims would require a level of 
individual participation that precludes associational 
standing. As noted, the Society has not appealed the 
dismissal of its damages claims. This is noteworthy because 
damages claims usually require significant individual 
participation, which fatally undercuts a request for 
associational standing. On this point, the Supreme Court 
has explained that 
 
       "[w]hether an association has standing to invoke the 
       court's remedial powers on behalf of its members 
       depends in substantial measure on the nature of the 
       relief sought. If in a proper case the association seeks 
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       a declaration, injunction, or some other form of 
       prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that 
       the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those 
       members of the association actually injured. Indeed, in 
       all cases in which we have expressly recognized 
       standing in associations to represent their members, 
       the relief sought has been of this kind." 
 
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 515 (1975)). Because claims for monetary relief 
usually require individual participation, courts have held 
associations cannot generally raise these claims on behalf 
of their members. E.g., Air Transp. Ass'n v. Reno, 80 F.3d 
477, 484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (collecting cases); Sanner v. 
Bd. of Trade, 62 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). 
Specifically, the Supreme Court has counseled "that an 
association's action for damages running solely to its 
members would be barred for want of the association's 
standing to sue." United Food & Commercial Workers Union 
Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 546 (1996) 
(relying on Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343). Had the Society 
continued to press its claims for damages on appeal, 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) would be entirely appropriate. 
 
The sole associational standing question remains 
whether, taking the allegations as true, the Pennsylvania 
Psychiatric Society's requests for declaratory and injunctive 
relief will require an inappropriate level of individual 
participation.3 We first addressed this question in Hospital 
Council of Western Pennsylvania v. City of Pittsburgh, where 
an association alleged that certain city and counties 
threatened to discriminate against nonprofit hospitals on 
taxation, zoning, and contract matters if the hospitals 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Individual participation by an association's membership may be 
unnecessary when the relief sought is prospective (i.e., an injunction or 
declaratory judgment). See Brock, 477 U.S. at 287-88; Ark. Med. Soc'y, 
Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 528 (8th Cir. 1993); Action Alliance of 
Senior 
Citizens v. Snider, Civ. A. No. 93-4827, 1994 WL 384990, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
July 18, 1994) ("[P]articipation of individual members is rarely necessary 
when injunctive relief rather than individual damages is sought. Hospital 
Council, 949 F.2d at 89. This particularly true where . . . a broad based 
change in procedure rather than individualized injunctive relief is 
sought."). 
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refused to make voluntary payments in lieu of taxes. 949 
F.2d 83. Interpreting Hunt's third prong through the prism 
of earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence, we rejected the 
city's argument that some individual participation violated 
this requirement.4 Id. at 89. Explaining the circumstances 
on which this conclusion rested, we concluded: 
 
       [T]he claims asserted by the Council would require 
       some participation by some Council members. This 
       case, unlike many prior associational standing cases, 
       does not involve a challenge to a statute, regulation, or 
       ordinance, but instead involves a challenge to alleged 
       practices that would probably have to be proved by 
       evidence regarding the manner in which the defendants 
       treated individual member hospitals. Adjudication of 
       such claims would likely require that member hospitals 
       provide discovery, and trial testimony by officers and 
       employees of member hospitals might be needed as 
       well. Nevertheless, since participation by "each 
       [allegedly] injured party" would not be necessary, we 
       see no ground for denying associational standing. 
 
Id. at 89-90. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
subsequently adopted our interpretation of Hunt 's third 
prong in Retired Chicago Police Association v. City of 
Chicago, where the Retired Chicago Police Association sued 
the city to bar implementation of increased health care 
premiums. 7 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 1993). In this drawn-out 
litigation, the Retired Chicago Police Association 
represented city employees who allegedly had been 
guaranteed subsidized health coverage. When the city 
attempted to raise the coverage price because of escalating 
costs, the employees claimed the city reneged on its 
promise and sued. Believing the allegations would require 
individual participation, the district court concluded the 
association lacked standing. Id. at 600-01. Relying on 
Hospital Council, the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded, holding the association could attempt to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In its brief, Keystone suggests reasons why individual participation 
would be required. 
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establish its allegations with limited membership  
participation.5 Id. at 602-03. 
 
The MCOs argue the medical coverage decisions on 
psychiatric care and substance abuse services, which form 
the basis of the organization's allegations, are fact-intensive 
inquiries. For this reason, they assert the examination of 
medical care determinations will demand significant 
individual participation. To buttress this point, defendants 
note they offer subscribers various health care plans that in 
turn provide varying benefits. Consequently, they argue, 
demonstrating any single coverage decision violated their 
obligations will entail a case-by-case examination of a 
patient's condition along with the corresponding available 
benefits. In support, defendants rely on Rent Stabilization 
Association v. Dinkins, where an association of landowners 
alleged rent regulations constituted an unconstitutional 
taking of their property. 5 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993). There, 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the 
extensive individual testimony required to adjudicate the 
claims would violate Hunt. Id. at 596; see also Reid v. Dep't 
of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(holding union lacked standing to assert back pay claims 
for its members because each claim depended on member's 
individual circumstances). The court reasoned the claims 
foreclosed standing because it 
 
       would have to engage in an ad hoc factual inquiry for 
       each landlord who alleges that he has suffered a 
       taking. [The court] would have to determine the 
       landlord's particular return based on a host of 
       individualized financial data, and [the court] would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated: 
 
       We believe that the approach of the Third Circuit is a sound one. 
We 
       can discern no indication in Warth, Hunt , or Brock that the 
Supreme 
       Court intended to limit representational standing to cases in which 
       it would not be necessary to take any evidence from individual 
       members of an association . . . . Rather, the third prong of Hunt 
is 
       more plausibly read as dealing with situations in which it is 
       necessary to establish "individualized proof," 432 U.S. at 344, for 
       litigants not before the court in order to support the cause of 
action. 
 
7 F.3d at 601-02. 
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       have to investigate the reasons for any failure to obtain 
       an adequate return, because the Constitution certainly 
       cannot be read to guarantee a profit to an inefficient or 
       incompetent landlord. 
 
Rent Stabilization, 5 F.3d at 596. But the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit has not rejected associational 
standing where only limited individual participation by 
some members would be required. See N.Y. State Nat'l Org. 
for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1349 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(association warranted standing although evidence from 
some individual members necessary); see also Nat'l Ass'n of 
Coll. Bookstores, Inc. v. Cambridge Univ. Press, 990 F. 
Supp. 245, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). We agree that 
conferring associational standing would be improper for 
claims requiring a fact-intensive-individual inquiry. 
 
The District Court reviewed the Pennsylvania Psychiatric 
Society's allegations--overly restrictive treatment 
authorizations; care determinations based on criteria 
besides medical necessity; creation of improper obstacles to 
physician credentialing; imposition of overly-burdensome 
administrative requirements; failure to pay psychiatrists for 
rendered services; direct interference with psychiatrist- 
patient relations--and found each assertion would 
necessitate significant individual participation. If this were 
true, the organization would not satisfy the associational 
standing requirements.6 
 
But the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society maintains the 
heart of its complaint involves systemic policy violations 
that will make extensive individual participation 
unnecessary. In effect, the Society contends the methods 
the MCOs employ for making decisions--e.g., authorizing or 
denying mental health services, credentialing physicians, 
and reimbursement--represent breaches of contract as well 
as tortious conduct. Therefore, insofar as its allegations 
concern how the MCOs render these decisions, the 
Society's complaint "involve[s] [ ] challenge[s] to alleged 
practices," Hospital Council, 949 F.2d at 89, that may be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Likewise, if the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society continued to press 
damages claims on behalf of its members, it would not meet the 
requirements for associational standing. See supra p. 8. 
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established with sample testimony, which may not involve 
specific, factually intensive, individual medical care 
determinations. See Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 868 
F.2d 653, 663 (4th Cir. 1989), aff 'd on other grounds sub 
nom. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). 
 
If the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society can establish 
these claims with limited individual participation, it would 
satisfy the requirements for associational standing. While 
we question whether the Society can accomplish this, at 
this stage of the proceedings on a motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing, we review the sufficiency of the pleadings 
and "must accept as true all material allegations of the 
complaint and must construe the complaint in favor of the 
plaintiff." Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage 
Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Warth, 
422 U.S. at 501). For this reason, we believe the Society's 
suit should not be dismissed before it is given the 
opportunity to establish the alleged violations without 
significant individual participation (as noted, if the damages 
claims remained, we would affirm the dismissal under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Moreover, as the organization concedes, 
if it cannot adequately demonstrate the MCOs' breaches 
with limited individual participation, its suit should be 
dismissed. Because this appeal arises on a motion to 
dismiss, the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society should be 
allowed to move forward with its claims within the 
boundaries of associational standing. Therefore, we 
conclude that the District Court erred in dismissing the 
matter on this basis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
Nevertheless, the District Court is free to revisit this issue. 
 
B. 
 
In addition to advancing the rights of its member 
psychiatrists, the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society seeks to 
assert the claims of its members' patients who are also 
allegedly injured by defendants' practices. Because the 
patients are not members of, or otherwise directly 
associated with, the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society, the 
Society does not have associational standing to assert their 
claims. Nonetheless, the Society maintains it may bring the 
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patients' claims under the doctrine of third-party standing.7 
In particular, the Society contends its member psychiatrists 
have third-party standing to assert the claims of their 
patients, and the Society has standing to bring the claims 
of its members, including their third-party claims. 
Defendants have challenged both of these steps. Therefore, 
we must decide, first, whether the member psychiatrists 
have third-party standing to bring the claims of their 
patients, and second, whether the Pennsylvania Psychiatric 
Society has associational standing to assert these members' 
third-party claims. 
 
1. 
 
Apart from the constitutional requirements for standing,8 
courts have imposed a set of prudential limitations on the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction over third-party claims. 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) ("[T]he federal 
judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential principles 
that bear on the question of standing.") (quotation and 
citation omitted); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498; Powell v. Ridge, 
189 F.3d 387, 404 (3d Cir. 1999). The restrictions against 
third-party standing do not stem from the Article III "case 
or controversy" requirement, but rather from prudential 
concerns,9 Amato v. Wilentz , 952 F.2d 742, 748 (3d Cir. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Third-party standing is also commonly known as jus tertii standing. 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 n.22 (1999); The Pitt News, 
215 F.3d at 362 n.6; see also Henry Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 
Colum. L. Rev. 277, 278 n.6 (1984) (explaining jus tertii standing). 
8. Under standing doctrine, a plaintiff must satisfy three constitutional 
preconditions: (1) a cognizable injury that is (2) causally connected to 
the 
alleged conduct and is (3) capable of being redressed by a favorable 
judicial decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; see also supra pp. 6-7. 
9. The Supreme Court has consistently held that standing to assert 
third-party rights is a prudential matter: 
 
       [O]ur decisions have settled that limitations on a litigant's 
assertion 
       of jus tertii are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem 
from 
       a salutary "rule of self-restraint" designed to minimize 
unwarranted 
       intervention into controversies where the applicable constitutional 
       questions are ill-defined and speculative. 
 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-95 (1976); see also Brown Group, 517 
U.S. at 557; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Singleton v. 
Wulff, 
428 U.S. 106, 123-24 (1976) (plurality opinion); Warth 422 U.S. at 499; 
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255, 257 (1953). 
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1991), which prevent courts from "deciding questions of 
broad social import where no individual rights would be 
vindicated and . . . limit access to the federal courts to 
those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 
(1979); see also Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 
U.S. 947, 955 (1984). 
 
It is a well-established tenet of standing that a"litigant 
must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and 
cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests 
of third parties." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991); 
see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 
(1982); Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 538 (3d 
Cir. 1994). This principle is based on the assumption that 
"third parties themselves usually will be the best 
proponents of their own rights," Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 
106, 114 (1976) (plurality opinion), which serves to foster 
judicial restraint and ensure the clear presentation of 
issues. See Munson, 467 U.S. at 955. 
 
Yet the prohibition is not invariable and our 
jurisprudence recognizes third-party standing under certain 
circumstances.10 Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 397- 
98 (1998); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711 
(1987) (acknowledging general rule that party must assert 
own interests is "subject to exceptions"). In particular, if a 
course of conduct "prevents a third-party from entering into 
a relationship with the litigant (typically a contractual 
relationship), to which relationship the third party has a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. For instance, doctors may be able to assert the rights of patients; 
lawyers may be able to assert the rights of clients; vendors may be able 
to assert the rights of customers; and candidates for public office may be 
able to assert the rights of voters. See, e.g. , Caplin & Drysdale, 
Chartered 
v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (holding lawyer could bring Sixth 
Amendment lawsuit on behalf of criminal defendant); Singleton, 428 U.S. 
106 (conferring standing on physicians on behalf of patients to challenge 
a statute that excluded funding for abortions from Medicaid benefits); 
Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (allowing vendor to challenge statute that prohibited 
males under age of twenty-one from buying beer); Mancuso v. Taft, 476 
F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973) (permitting candidate for public office to raise 
voters' rights). 
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legal entitlement," third-party standing may be appropriate. 
United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 
(1990); see also Munson, 467 U.S. at 954-58 (fundraiser 
had third-party standing to challenge statute limiting fees 
charitable organizations could pay because law infringed on 
organizations' right to hire fundraiser for a higher fee). 
 
The Supreme Court has found that the principles 
animating these prudential concerns are not subverted if 
the third party is hindered from asserting its own rights 
and shares an identity of interests with the plaintiff. See 
Craig, 429 U.S. at 193-94; Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114-15; 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972). More 
specifically, third-party standing requires the satisfaction of 
three preconditions: 1) the plaintiff must suffer injury; 2) 
the plaintiff and the third party must have a "close 
relationship"; and 3) the third party must face some 
obstacles that prevent it from pursuing its own claims. 
Campbell, 523 U.S. at 397; Powers, 499 U.S. at 411; The 
Pitt News, 215 F.3d at 362. It remains for courts to balance 
these factors to determine if third-party standing is 
warranted. Amato, 952 F.2d at 750. 
 
a. 
 
Although the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society itself has 
not suffered direct injury, it is uncontested that it properly 
pleaded that defendants' policies and procedures have 
economically injured its member psychiatrists and 
undermined their ability to provide quality health care. 
Thus, while the Society does not itself stand in an 
appropriate relationship to the patients' claims to directly 
assert them, its members may have third-party standing to 
do so.11 And because plaintiff seeks to establish standing on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The District Court held--and the dissent argues--that the 
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society could not raise these claims because it 
did not itself suffer injury. Injury to the Society, however, is not 
relevant 
to the issue of the psychiatrists' standing to bring the patients' claims. 
Because of the Society's posture, that is the initial question to be 
resolved. Only after it is determined that the member psychiatrists would 
have third-party standing over these claims do we assess whether the 
Society can bring its members' third-party claims. It is in the latter 
context that injury to appellant itself is a potential requirement, which 
we discuss below. 
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the basis of its members' standing to bring these claims, 
the members are the appropriate focus of inquiry for these 
purposes. 
 
b. 
 
We next turn to whether the psychiatrists and their 
patients have a sufficiently "close relationship" which will 
permit the physicians to effectively advance their patients' 
claims. To meet this standard, this relationship must 
permit the psychiatrists to operate " `fully, or very nearly, as 
effective a proponent' " of their patients' rights as the 
patients themselves.12 Powers , 499 U.S. at 413 (quoting 
Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115). 
 
The patients' relationships with their psychiatrists fulfills 
this requirement. See supra note 12. In Singleton v. Wulff, 
the Supreme Court granted physicians third-party standing 
on behalf of their patients to challenge a statute prohibiting 
Medicaid funding for certain abortions. 428 U.S. 106. 
Because of the inherent closeness of the doctor-patient 
relationship, the plurality found the physicians could 
efficaciously advocate their patients' interests. Id. at 117 
(noting "abortion decision is one in which the physician is 
intimately involved"). The relationship forged between 
psychiatrists and their patients is equally compelling. 
 
Psychiatrists clearly have the kind of relationship with 
their patients which lends itself to advancing claims on 
their behalf. This intimate relationship and the resulting 
mental health treatment ensures psychiatrists can 
effectively assert their patients' rights. Because the 
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society alleges the MCOs prevent 
patients from receiving necessary mental health services 
and psychiatrists from providing them, its member 
psychiatrists would be well-suited to litigate these claims 
for both parties, as their interests are clearly aligned. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Courts have generally recognized physicians' authority to pursue the 
claims of their patients. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. 
Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 290 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1984) (collecting cases 
where physicians allowed to assert patients' claims); see also Planned 
Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 147 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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Amato, 952 F.2d at 751 (noting doctor-patient relationship 
provides strong likelihood of effective advocacy by a 
physician on behalf of his patients). Accordingly, we believe 
the psychiatrist-patient relationship would satisfy the 
second criterion for third-party standing.13 
 
c. 
 
Finally, we examine whether the mental health patients 
face obstacles to pursuing litigation themselves. This 
criterion does not require an absolute bar from suit, but 
"some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or 
her own interests," Powers, 499 U.S. at 411. In other 
words, a party need not face insurmountable hurdles to 
warrant third-party standing.14Id. at 415 (holding excluded 
juror's limited incentive to bring discrimination suit 
satisfied obstacle requirement for criminal defendant to 
merit third-party standing); Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117 
(recognizing lawsuit's invasion of patient's privacy and 
"imminent mootness" of pregnancy sufficiently impeded 
patient from bringing suit herself). The District Court found 
the patients' mental health problems did not significantly 
hinder them from suing. We disagree. 
 
The stigma associated with receiving mental health 
services presents a considerable deterrent to litigation. Cf. 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 622 (1979) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) ("There can be no doubt that commitment to a 
mental institution results in massive curtailment of liberty. 
In addition to the physical confinement involved, a person's 
liberty is also substantially affected by the stigma attached 
to treatment in a mental hospital.") (quotations and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The importance of the psychiatrist-patient relationship has been 
recognized in other settings too. In Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme 
Court upheld the evidentiary privilege for psychotherapist-patient 
communications. 518 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1996). 
 
14. One treatise insists that "cases do not demand an absolute 
impossibility of suit in order to fall within the[impediment] exception. 
At 
the other end of the spectrum, a practical disincentive to sue may 
suffice, although a mere disincentive is less persuasive than a concrete 
impediment." 15 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 
S 101.51[3][c]. 
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citations omitted); Humphreys v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 
96 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting "psychiatric 
patients suffer a stigma in society") (quotation and citation 
omitted). For example, the Supreme Court recognized in 
Singleton that the obstacles confronted by women in 
opposing an abortion statute were not overwhelming. In 
fact, the Court acknowledged the suit could have been 
brought pseudonymously or as a class. Singleton , 428 U.S. 
at 117. The Court still concluded that a woman's desire to 
protect her privacy could discourage her from bringing suit 
and constituted a sufficient impediment. Id. at 117-18. 
These concerns apply with equal, if not greater, force to 
mental health patients. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. 
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001) ("There can be little 
doubt, then, that persons with mental or physical 
impairments are confronted with prejudice which can stem 
from indifference or insecurity as well as from malicious ill 
will.") (Kennedy, J., concurring). Besides the stigmatization 
that may blunt mental health patients' incentive to pursue 
litigation, their impaired condition may prevent them from 
being able to assert their claims. Therefore, we believe the 
patients' fear of stigmatization, coupled with their potential 
incapacity to pursue legal remedies, operates as a powerful 
deterrent to bringing suit. 
 
Because the third-party claims asserted by the 
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society do not implicate any 
constitutional rights of the psychiatrists' patients, the 
MCOs contend that granting third-party standing is 
unwarranted. While successful third-party standing claims 
have involved alleged violations of third parties' 
constitutional rights, Singleton and its progeny have not 
stipulated that constitutional claims are a prerequisite.15 It 
is true that the rule against third-party standing"normally 
bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of 
others in order to obtain relief from injury to themselves." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Simply raising a third party's constitutional claims will not in and 
of 
itself satisfy the requirements for third-party standing. For instance, a 
litigant may not assert a third party's Fourth Amendment rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure to prevent the admission of damaging 
evidence. E.g., United States v. Payner , 447 U.S. 727 (1980); see also 
Monaghan, supra note 7, at 305 n.149. 
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Warth, 422 U.S. at 509. Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
has noted that courts must consider "the relationship of the 
litigant to the person whose rights are being asserted; the 
ability of the person to advance his own rights; and the 
impact of the litigation on third-party interests." Caplin & 
Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3. But the Court has not held 
that a constitutional claim must also be alleged, see, e.g., 
Powers, 499 U.S. at 410-11, and absent further guidance, 
we will not impose this requirement. For these reasons, we 
hold the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society's member 
psychiatrists would have third-party standing to assert the 
claims of their patients. 
 
2. 
 
The Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society contends it has 
standing to bring these third-party claims just as it has 
standing to bring its members' other claims under the 
doctrine of associational standing. Defendants maintain the 
patients' claims are too attenuated from the Society to 
permit derivative standing. 
 
We decline to adopt a per se rule barring such derivative 
claims. The Supreme Court did not delineate in Hunt which 
types of claims associations could bring on behalf of their 
members, but rather simply held that "an association has 
standing to bring suit on behalf of its members" when the 
requisite elements are established. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. 
 
The limitations on derivative standing, therefore, are to 
be determined by applying the test for associational 
standing specified in Hunt. Our holding that the 
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society has alleged facts sufficient 
to establish the third-party standing of its members to 
bring their patients' claims implies the satisfaction of only 
the first requirement of the Hunt test--that "its members 
would otherwise have standing" to bring these claims. A 
third-party claim must also meet the requirements that 
"the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the 
organization's purpose" and that "neither the claim asserted 
nor the relief requested requires the participation of 
individual members in the lawsuit." Id. These factors inform 
the analysis whether an association stands in the correct 
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relationship to a claim to allow it to assert that claim on 
behalf of others. 
 
Other courts of appeals have adopted this approach in 
finding standing in similar cases. In Fraternal Order of 
Police v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia granted an organization derivative authority to 
assert the third-party claims of its members. 152 F.3d 998, 
1002 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[T]he presence of[the chief law 
enforcement officers] as members gives the Order standing 
to make these [third-party] claims as well.").16 The Fraternal 
Order of Police sued to contest the constitutionality of 
federal legislation that prohibited supplying firearms to 
police officers convicted of domestic violence. Id. at 1000- 
01. Because a chief law enforcement officer would be liable 
for supplying a firearm to a subordinate convicted of 
domestic violence and because the failure to supply a 
weapon could also violate the subordinate officer's rights, 
the court of appeals found the chiefs had third-party 
standing to advance the claims of their officers. Id. at 1002. 
Since the chiefs were members of the Fraternal Order of 
Police, the association had standing to advance the chiefs' 
claims as well as the claims of their subordinates. Similar 
to this case, none of the members were themselves party to 
the suit.17 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also granted an 
organization derivative authority to enjoin the enforcement 
of a statute requiring private schools to administer 
proficiency tests in Ohio Association of Independent Schools 
v. Goff. 92 F.3d 419, 421-22 (6th Cir. 1996). As parties to 
the litigation, the association's member schools had 
standing because failure to comply with the statute would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The opinion containing the discussion of standing in Fraternal Order 
of Police was reversed on rehearing. Fraternal Order of Police v. United 
States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In the second opinion, however, 
the court stated, "The analysis of standing on this issue is unchanged 
from our prior opinion." Id. at 903. 
 
17. Contrary to the dissent, we believe Fraternal Order of Police supports 
recognition of the combination of associational standing and third-party 
standing, since the standing "bridge" in that case--the chief law 
enforcement officers--were not parties to the litigation. 
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result in the loss of their school charters. Id.  at 422. The 
private schools also had third-party standing to assert the 
constitutional right of their students' parents to direct their 
children's education. Because its member schools could be 
injured by the statute, the Ohio Association of Independent 
Schools also had standing to assert their claims. Since its 
member schools had standing to assert the rights of the 
parents, the court held the Ohio Association of Independent 
Schools also had standing to sue on behalf of the parents 
whose children attended its members' schools. Id. ("The 
member schools . . . have standing . . . on behalf of parents 
of students who are threatened with the nonreceipt of 
diplomas. Consequently, the OAIS itself, as an organization 
dedicated exclusively to advancing the interests of the 
member schools, has associational standing to challenge 
the statutes at issue."). Thus, while some member schools 
--the intermediate parties--were parties to the dispute, the 
Sixth Circuit's standing analysis did not rely on that fact. 
We see a compelling analogy between these cases and the 
claims before us, and believe the Pennsylvania Psychiatric 
Society may have standing to assert its members' third- 
party claims. 
 
The District Court found the Pennsylvania Psychiatric 
Society lacked derivative authority to pursue the claims of 
its members' patients because it had not suffered direct 
injury itself. On this point, defendants contend Goff is inapt 
because the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not 
require that the association suffer injury in fact. See Amato, 
952 F.2d at 749. This criticism is misplaced. It is generally 
true that third-party standing requires the party who 
advances the interests of another party to also suffer 
discrete injury. As noted previously, this prudential 
requirement sharpens presentation of claims and avoids 
litigation of general grievances. But when an association, 
which has not sustained direct injury, obtains standing to 
pursue the claims of its members, the association may rely 
on the injuries sustained by its members to satisfy the 
injury-in-fact requirement. Consequently, once an 
organization's members establish third-party standing, the 
prudential concerns are alleviated if the association also 
has authority to assert its members' claims. 
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It is a well-recognized anomaly of representational 
standing that the individuals who have sustained the 
requisite injury to satisfy the constitutional and prudential 
standing criteria are not in fact responsible for bringing 
suit. So long as the association's members have or will 
suffer sufficient injury to merit standing and their members 
possess standing to represent the interests of third-parties, 
then associations can advance the third-party claims of 
their members without suffering injuries themselves. 18 If on 
remand the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society warrants 
associational standing to represent its members, we 
conclude it also may have derivative authority to raise the 
claims of its members' patients.19 
 
IV. 
 
We now consider the arbitration provision in the Provider 
Agreement between the MCOs and the psychiatrists. 20 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. In Public Citizen v. FTC, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held Public Citizen and other organizations had standing to 
challenge an FTC regulation exempting certain promotional items from a 
statutory requirement that all advertisements for smokeless tobacco 
products carry certain health warnings. 869 F.2d 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
The court held the organizations had associational standing to assert the 
claims of their members. Id. at 1550. Additionally, the court held that 
members who were also parents had standing to advance claims for their 
children. The organizations thus had the derivative authority to assert 
the claims of their members' children as well. Id. 
 
19. Because the District Court held the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society 
did not have standing to assert the claims of its members' patients, it 
found the organization itself did not fall within the "zone of interests" 
of 
the common law fraud or statutory fraud claims asserted on behalf of 
the psychiatrists' patients. Because we reverse and remand the District 
Court's judgment on associational and third-party standing, it will have 
to reconsider this issue. 
 
20. The Provider Agreement provides in part: 
 
       Section 10.1 Resolution of Disputes. In the event that a dispute 
       between Green Spring and Provider arises out of or is related to 
this 
       Agreement, the parties to the dispute agree to negotiate in good 
faith 
       to attempt to resolve the dispute. In the event the dispute is not 
       resolved within 30 days of the date one party sent written notice 
of 
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Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society argues that the District 
Court erred in holding all its claims were subject to 
mandatory arbitration. The Society contends the arbitration 
provision should not apply to its member psychiatrists for 
several reasons: (1) the arbitration provision is an 
unconscionable contract of adhesion; (2) the organization's 
broad-based claims are beyond the scope of the arbitration 
provision; (3) claims regarding the process of determining 
medical necessity fall outside the purview of arbitration and 
pursuing these claims through the available internal review 
procedures would be futile; and (4) the psychiatrists with 
initial credentialing or re-credentialing claims do not have 
contracts with the MCOs requiring arbitration.21 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       the dispute to the other party, and if any party wishes to pursue 
the 
       dispute, it shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance 
       with the rules of the American Arbitration Association . . . . If 
the 
       dispute pertains to a matter which is generally administered in 
       accordance with Green Spring's procedures involving, for example, 
       credentialing or quality assurance, the procedures set forth by 
       Green Spring must be fully exhausted by Provider before Provider 
       may invoke its right to arbitration under this Section. Provider 
       acknowledges that the recommendation and determination of 
       whether Health Services are Medically Necessary shall be made in 
       accordance with Green Spring's policies and procedures and shall 
       not be subject to this Section 10. 
 
The Provider Agreement defines Medically Necessary Health Services as: 
 
       Health Services including professional services and supplies 
       rendered by a Provider to identify or treat an illness that has 
been 
       diagnosed or is suspected, and which are: (a) consistent with (i) 
the 
       efficient diagnosis and treatment of a condition; and (ii) 
standards of 
       good medical practice; (b) required for other than convenience; (c) 
       the most appropriate supply or level of service; (d) unable to be 
       provided in a more cost-effective and efficient manner; and (e) 
       unable to be provided at a facility providing a less intensive 
level of 
       care. When applied to inpatient care, the term means: The needed 
       care cannot be safely given on other than an inpatient basis. 
 
21. The District Court believed that these claims had all been settled, 
but 
the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society maintains in its brief that these 
claims have not been addressed completely. Keystone also argues the 
association should be prohibited from asserting claims on behalf of 
psychiatrists that Green Spring Health Services has never credentialed 
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Because it denied the Society associational and third- 
party standing to advance the claims of its members' 
patients, the District Court did not did not examine 
whether the patients' claims would be subject to mandatory 
arbitration. The District Court only reviewed the effect of 
the arbitration provision on the credentialed psychiatrists 
who are Society members. It strikes us that, assuming the 
Society has standing to assert the claims of each party, the 
District Court will have to re-examine the scope as well as 
the effect of the arbitration provision on all the parties 
involved. Because we find the Pennsylvania Psychiatric 
Society survives a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, 
the District Court must sort through, in the first instance, 
the impact of the psychiatrists' arbitration clause on the 
alleged claims. 
 
V. 
 
We will reverse and remand the dismissal of the 
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society's complaint for lack of 
standing. Depending on the level of individual participation 
necessary to demonstrate its claims, the Society may have 
standing to press the claims of its member psychiatrists 
and their patients. Of course, we express no opinion as to 
the merits of any of the claims or defenses. 
 
We will reverse the order of the District Court and 
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
because their claims are not present in the Pennsylvania Psychiatric 
Society's Amended Complaint. See Pa. ex. rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, 
Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988). In addition, defendants contend 
that the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society has not asserted a single claim 
in its complaint on behalf of psychiatrists who have been denied 
credentialing by defendants. However, several of the allegations in the 
organization's amended complaint could arguably be read as asserting 
claims on behalf of this class of psychiatrists. Although the Amended 
Complaint is somewhat ambiguous, all these claims may be found woven 
throughout the allegations. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I agree with much of what the majority has said. I part 
company, however, with its conclusion that grants PPS a 
hybrid-type of third-party derivative standing. PPS argues 
that it has standing to litigate, not the interests of its 
member-psychiatrists, but rather the issues and interests 
of its member-psychiatrists' patients -- who are three steps 
removed from PPS. PPS's argument has three premises. Its 
first two premises are exceptions to the standing rule: 1) 
that PPS has associational standing to litigate on behalf of 
its member-psychiatrists; and, 2) that its member- 
psychiatrists have third-party standing to litigate on behalf 
of their patients. Its third premise is that these exceptions 
can be "stacked" to concoct a new exception to the standing 
rule. PPS thus concludes that it should have standing to 
litigate on behalf if its members' patients. 
 
The first two premises are sound, but I disagree with the 
majority on the third. PPS cannot piggy-back two discrete 
exceptions, to swallow up the long-standing rule that 
litigants must assert their own rights and interests. I 
cannot find, nor does PPS cite, any authority for stacking or 
piggy-backing these relationships into an attenuated 
concatenation of exceptions to the standing rule so as to 
confer standing on PPS. I would hold that PPS cannot seek 
relief based upon the rights and interests of remote third 
parties. I must therefore respectfully dissent on this point. 
 
Central to my conclusion is that PPS's third premise runs 
afoul of Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991), 
wherein we discussed the objectives and standards for 
third-party standing. Although third-party standing 
typically proves to be a nebulous prudential doctrine, 
sensitive to the particularities and peculiarities of the 
relationship between the parties and their claims, we 
distilled a basic test for third-party standing in Amato. Id. 
at 748-49. We require that the party seeking standing must 
first have suffered an injury in fact. If the party seeking 
standing has suffered an injury in fact, the court must then 
examine further, considering: a) the intimacy of the 
relationship between the parties; b) any impediment the 
party might have to advancing its own rights; and c) the 
identity of the interests between the parties. Id. at 749. 
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Applying the Amato standards, the District Court first 
found that PPS did not itself suffer an injury. No one 
disputes this fact. I agree with the District Court that 
because PPS has not even alleged a concrete injury to itself, 
it cannot satisfy Amato's most elementary standard. 
Standing should be denied to PPS on this test alone. 
 
The District Court, however, continued and found that 
even if PPS had alleged an injury in fact to itself, Amato's 
subsequent elements, or balancing tests, would not favor 
PPS third-party standing for its members' patients. The 
District Court found that the "relationship between PPS and 
the patient subscribers is so attenuated as to weigh against 
PPS to bring suit on behalf of persons with which it has no 
direct relationship." The District Court next found that 
"there appears to be no impediment to the patients seeking 
to enforce their legal claims themselves" and the patients 
face "no affirmative obstacle to sue[ ]." I agree with the 
District Court that even had PPS shown an injury-in-fact, 
the subsequent balancing test would not confer standing on 
PPS. The argument that psychiatric patients may face some 
impediment to bringing these claims themselves, because of 
the stigma attached to mental illness and psychiatric care, 
is mere speculation, and moreover, this factor is 
counterbalanced by the remoteness of the relationship 
between PPS and its members' patients. The relationship 
between PPS and the patients is nothing like the 
doctor/patient intimacy that supports that exception to the 
standing rule. 
 
Thus the District Court held that PPS should be denied 
third-party standing for its member' patients for three 
distinct reasons: 1) PPS suffered no injury in fact and 
therefore the Court did not need to entertain the secondary 
balancing factors set forth in Amato; 2) even if PPS did 
merit consideration under the balancing test, the balancing 
test would not weigh in favor of granting standing since 
PPS's relationship with its members' patients is too 
attenuated; and 3) the patients have no substantial 
obstacle to bringing their claims independently. I agree with 
all three reasons, and with the District Court's conclusion. 
 
PPS argues to us that the District Court "ignored 
significant case law recognizing derivative third-party 
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standing." Nonsense. None of the cases PPS cites are 
directly on point. PPS and its amici cite cases that confer 
standing to doctors to litigate on behalf of their patients. 
But this does nothing to advance PPS' argument on the 
"stacking" issue presented here. PPS cites both American 
College of Obstetricans v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 
1983) and Ohio Association of Independent Schools v. Goff, 
92 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 1996), to support the notion that "an 
association may assert third-party claims that could be 
brought by its members." Neither of these cases stand for 
such a notion. 
 
In Ohio Association, the association, along with several of 
its member schools, sought standing for parents of children 
in the schools to challenge the requirement of state 
formulated testing in private schools. Ohio Association, 92 
F.3d at 421. The Court found that the "OAIS member 
schools also have standing to assert the constitutional right 
of parents to direct their children's education." Id. at 422 
(emphasis added). Thus the Court did not find that the 
association had standing to assert parents' interests, but 
that individual schools had standing to do so. Thus the 
operative distinction between Ohio Association  and PPS' 
argument is that in Ohio Association both the association 
and its individual members jointly brought the suit, but 
here, PPS attempts to bring its claims to court without the 
participation of any of its members. 
 
American College presents the same problems for PPS. In 
American College, the challenge was brought by a team of 
an association, doctors, and medical providers. American 
College, 737 F.2d at 289. In a footnote the Court stated 
that the "district court concluded that plaintiff physicians, 
ACOG, and medical providers all had standing to raise their 
own interests (or the interests of members) and those of 
patients and customers in challenging the Act's 
constitutionality. We affirm this general conclusion." Id. at 
290 n.6. As in Ohio Association, the standing questions in 
American College turned on the doctors actually 
participating in the suit. The reason is obvious: The doctors 
provide the standing "bridge" between the association and 
the patients. All of the support cited in American College 
demonstrates the need for physicians to participate in the 
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suit to establish standing. Id. (citing City of Akron v. Akron 
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (challenge by 
abortion clinics and a physician); Planned Parenthood Ass'n 
v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (challenge by Planned 
Parenthood, two physicians and an abortion clinic); Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976) (challenge 
by Planned Parenthood and two physicians); Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (challenge by two physicians)). 
 
Other cases demonstrate this need for a caretaker, such 
as a parent or advising officer, to be a party to the suit to 
provide the bridge between the association and the harmed 
individual. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 
152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (granting standing for an 
organization whose members included chief law 
enforcement officers based on the chief law enforcement 
officer's standing to advance the equal-protection rights of 
subordinate officers); Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (organizations had standing to challenge an 
FTC regulation that exempted certain promotional items 
from the requirement that advertising for smokeless 
tobacco products carry health warnings, since the members 
of the organizations included parents of children who might 
be injured by the lack of warnings). 
 
In summary, I agree with the manner in which the 
District Court applied the Amato standard. I am convinced 
that PPS has neither successfully met (nor 
circumnavigated, as the case may be) Amato's requirement 
that PPS must have itself suffered an injury. Hence I 
respectfully dissent and would affirm the District Court. 
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